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In the following thesis, an overview of covert channels within Voice over IP is given and then 
expanded upon by presenting an experiment which proves the ability to hide messages within 
the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) of a Voice over IP 
packet.    The plain text nature of the SIP and SDP packets allow for an easily embedded 
message to be encoded into the expected data, while also being “hidden in plain sight” due to 
the packet only being sent once per VoIP session.  While previous papers [15] have proposed 
the ability to hide covert messages within the plain text SIP and SDP packets of a VoIP call 
stream, this thesis is the first to carefully analyze and test the ability to embed data in these 
packets and send a covert message, based on an agreement between the sending and receiving 
parties.    Results include the success for covert messages to be hidden within the Max-
Forwards field, a field used for the total number of hops between sender and receiver, the V 
field, a field used for the version of SIP being used, the T field, usually used for the time a 
session becomes active on the sending and receiving ends, and finally the O field which 
designates the owner the call was originally sent from.  This success was met with equal failure 
of previously proposed abilities to hide messages [15] in the Branch statement, tag field, and 
Call-ID field.  A method for systems administrators or network administrators to detect covert 
channels coming in over a VoIP enabled network using a simple, modified java based packet 
capture tool is then presented with the ability to check the Max-Forwards, V, T and O fields, 
due to their low entropy and easy detectability.  Using this method, a discussion is given 




In the original thesis written for proposal to embed covert messages into voice over IP, it was 
claimed that voice over IP packets have the ability to be modified to include covert messages in 
a number of fields throughout the session initiation protocol (SIP) and session description 
protocol (SDP) [15].  The plain text nature of the SIP and SDP packets and rarely implemented 
encryption for these packets on software based phones, and hardware alike, make them 
targets for attackers who possess the knowledge of intercepting, modifying the packets which 
contain the initiation and description, and then forwarding the packets onward, almost 
instantaneously to ensure that there is little change in the call as compared to a normal call 
without modification.  It has also been claimed [15] that fields within the SIP and SDP packets 
have the ability to be changed without affecting the quality of the call, while still being able to 
hold a significant number of characters which will allow for covert message strings to be sent to 
a receiving party.  On account of no proof or testing found to back up these claims, this thesis 
attempts to prove these theoretical claims and then given a systems administrator or network 
administrator the ability to easily detect covert channels being sent via their own network, 
merely by running a Java based application and reviewing the logs produced. 
Within this follow up thesis, results and experimental setup will be explained in addition to an 
explanation of the tools developed to detect these covert channels. The basic structure of the 
thesis will be as follows: In section 2 it will cover the background of covert channels and the 
closely related topic of steganography including steganography throughout history, present day 
steganography, covert channels and how they relate to steganography in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 
and 2.4, respectively. In part 3 a discussion of applications to Voice over IP will be given with 
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specifics given about the protocols contained within Voice over IP and how covert messages are 
able to be embedded in each.  In part 4 the experiment setup will be explained and followed, as 
well as the results of the experiment being given in section 5.  Further discussion regarding 
advantages and disadvantages of this method of covert channels will take place in section 6. In 
section 7 an exploration of entropy will be done, followed by section 8 which will explain a Java 
based packet sniffing tool, modified to detect and easily present covert channels to a systems 
administrator.  A brief exploration of tools developed by colleagues at Rochester Institute of 
Technology will take place in section 9, followed by ideas for future work and the concluding 
paragraph in sections 10 and 11. 
2. Background 
2. 1 A Brief History of Covert Channels and Steganography 
Steganography, or “concealed writing” as roughly translated from Greek [25], is the art of 
embedding a message into a textual or graphical piece of work so that the message is 
unreadable and virtually unrecognizable to anyone without the knowledge of how to retrieve 
and view it. Steganography has a rich past and has been used for ages within the textual and 
graphical media areas, and can easily be used within the digital media arena as well.  It was the 
precursor to digital covert channels and thus can be said to be quite similar. 
The history of covert channels date back to before modern methods existed for detecting or 
decoding hidden messages within written media.  Specifically, creating and decoding hidden 
messages was first recorded around 480 BC when the Greeks used covert channels to hide 
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messages to inform the Spartans of the plans for an invasion of Xerxes by removing the wax 
cover from a wooden table and writing the plans for the invasion on the wood before “covering 
the message over with the wax again. In this way the tablets, being apparently blank, would 
cause no trouble with the guards along the road….” [11]. This method has also made its way 
into pop culture through TV shows reenacting the battles of World War II, showing the allies 
passing messages into Italy on the backs of wine bottle labels. Whether this was a true practice 
could not be found and therefore could not be documented past this pop culture reference 
[24]. One method during the current time period is the sending of a message by a German spy 
which, in most other contexts, wouldn’t be seen as a suspicious message.  While the message 
read:  
“Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored.  Isman hard 
hit.  Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on by products, ejecting suets 
and vegetable oils.” 
A message was actually sent which indicated: “Pershing sails from NY June 1.”, found by taking 
the second letter of each word within the original message [11]. 
A historical example of steganography dates back to the 16
th
 century when Joannes Trithemius 
wrote three pieces of literature in Latin, which are said to be the first works which discuss 
cryptology and the ability to embed hidden messages in a textual or graphical manner. Upon 
further review of these pieces of work, scientists found that the third book contained multiple 
steganographical messages including the equivalent of “The quick brown fox jumps over the 
lazy dog” as well as “The bearer of this letter is a rogue thief. Guard yourself against him. He 
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wants to do something to you,” both in Latin. Although these messages were meant to be 
apparent to the other party to whom Trithemius was sending the message to, it was not 
discovered and translated until 1996 by two German Researchers, Dr. Thomas Ernst and Dr. Jim 
Reeds. Given that it took so long to find these hidden messages, this example shows the power 
of steganography to hide a message in plain sight [12]. 
Other message types included the use of quilts during the Civil War to guide slaves over a given 
path or pass on messages without the ability for slave owners to recognize the patterns and 
symbols within the quilt. As seen in Figure 1, one example is the use of the “bear claw” to 
indicate to slaves a specific path to follow to their freedom [12]. The crew of the U.S.S. Pueblo 
also used various hand positions while being photographed to send the message of “snowjob” 
to their allies after being captured [12]. 
 
 
Figure 1: The bear claw quilt to indicate a safe route to slaves [12] 
2. 2 Present Day Covert Channels and Steganography 
In terms of present use and the justification behind the project described in this thesis, there 
has been an ever growing interest in the use of covert channels and steganography after the 
events of 9/11/2001. With terrorism being a very real threat and the ability for terrorists to use 
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both technologically simple and complex means to hide messages to be sent to followers, an 
interest has been taken in covert channels and steganography, as well as the ability to carry 
messages without the knowledge of a middle party [14]. There have been reports of the 
possibility of messages being hidden within pornographic websites as well as in eBay auctions 
and images, but thus far no suspected images or auctions have been made public [13]. In 
addition to these threats, the proposal has been given that there could possibly be hidden 
messages in the television or audio broadcasts from Osama Bin Laden [17]. Because covert 
channels and steganography are so hard to detect, there have not been any known cases 
released to the public, but research is still going on to address these fears. 
While most uses of steganography are seen as negative and only used to bypass common 
understanding of a specific piece of work, there are also legitimate uses for steganography as 
well. The use of one way keys in the forms of SHA1 and MD5 keys has become a prevalent way 
for software users to know if the software they are using is the same as the one released by the 
software company. Use of steganography in email has become popular in organizations and 
even countries which do not allow for the use of encryption on their email. This steganography 
can be in the form of line shifting, word shifting, or hiding messages within different parts of 
the message, as can be seen in Figure 2 which is a note sent from California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger to members of the California State Assembly (note the first letter of each line).  
Watermarking on images and audio files allow for the true ownership to be determined and 
















Figure 3: Photographical watermark example [23] 
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2. 3 What is a covert channel? 
While VoIP communication is a new concept, the idea of covert channels is far from new. The 
idea of covert channels, or hiding a piece of information inside of a communication medium 
which allows for a bypass of security measures on that communications medium [26] was 
proposed over 30 years ago.  This specific phrasing and usage was first proposed in 1973 in an 
ACM paper by Butler Lampson. Until this point is was a relatively new idea which no one 
believed could be implemented in an electronic format. The Department of Defense eventually 
picked up this idea in 1985; once more research was done [26]. The formal definition and types 
of covert channels varies greatly between sources. For the sake of this thesis, a covert channel 
will be defined as: “The ability for a communication to be sent over a communication medium 
which was either not designed to send alternate communications over, or that allows for the 
bypass of system security policies within the process” [26].  Because of the amount of research 
into covert channels by multiple parties with multiple ideas into what they are, a truly formal 
definition is yet to be established. Thus, the thesis will use the preceding definition and will 
furthermore define three types of covert channels that can be used within VoIP.  
The authors of [26] discuss a number of different types of covert channels, to which this section 
applies and attempts to explain for the sake of enumerating the relevant types of covert 
channels. Covert channels have the ability to exist in both a user based model or within a kernel 
based model. In other words, a covert channel has the ability to run with different types of 
permission, thus giving it different types of access to the resources of its host and destination 
machine. As the average user has the ability to write to a “profile” on a source and destination 
machine, and can only write to the software which supports the machine and its operations, it 
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is said that the user will generally have a user space covert channel ability. Simply put, this 
means that a covert channel may be able to be spread through one of the mediums this thesis 
will cover in subsequent paragraphs, and be able to signal a second party by modifying, 
creating, writing to or broadcasting through a piece of software or file. This can be the writing 
to a file on the destination machine, the modification of a protocol as viewed through a piece of 
software, attempting to access the destination machine on a given port or with a certain 
protocol, or signaling the second party with a covert message while using a third party 
application such as a MMORPG game. The second basic type of existence that a covert channel 
has is in a kernel based model which requires the covert channel to be able to interface with 
the machine itself, fully bypassing the operating system altogether, but also requiring a very 
high permission which is generally hard to do. To send a covert channel within kernel mode 
requires the user to become an authority over the hardware itself, thus being able to leave 
messages within unused sections of system memory (RAM), modifying processes being run 
within the central processing unit (CPU) to send a signal, or even modifying properties of the 
video which the user sees by sending signals through the video card. While there are programs 
that are available to change some of these values, they are mainly used for system utilities and 
generally are not used except for locally on a machine and in cases where a recovery or other 
such utility is needed because of the dangers they introduce to the system. While there are two 
different types of existences that covert channels can manifest themselves as, there are also 
three different types of covert channels which can be used to send a message to the user on a 
destination computer. The first is commonly known as a storage channel, or value based spatial 
channel as phrased by the authors of [26], utilizes the idea of modifying packets or the area 
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which packets are stored within the destination machine [14]. These modifications usually 
consist of writing to the packets and embedding information to a header or footer of sorts, thus 
to be only received by the receiving party who is aware that there is information hidden within 
the packet. For example, when sending a packet over a medium through which a covert 
channel is being utilized, a packet may be of a certain length or may have a certain embedded 
header with 32 bits of data. If either one of these qualities is true that packet may represent the 
letter F in the schema of a mod 26 alphabet algorithm. An alternate use of covert channels is 
using a timing channel or value based temporal channel as phrased by the authors of [26]. This 
timing channel is true to its name in that it modifies the timing properties of packets and when 
they are sent or at what point they are sent in regards to their comparison in frequency [14]. 
For example, a packet sent with a time stamp ending in 1 may represent the letter A while 
another ending in 5 may represent E. This can also be applied to the frequency, in which the 
destination times how many packets it receives within a given amount of time and bases 
lettering algorithms on such. So, if 5 packets are received within a time period of 2 seconds, 
they may represent E, similar to the previous example. A third type of covert channel has gone 
unmentioned in most of the sources from which this research section was based. The authors 
of [26] propose a new type of covert channel which utilizes the transitions between events and 
how events, whether it is storage channels or timing channels, interact with each other at the 
destination. For instance, the example of modifying the port to which a protocol is sent is used 
within [26] where if a packet is sent to port 1234, and once received a second one is sent to 
port 6464, the destination may know that this is representative of the letter A. As with the rest 
of the types of covert channels covered previously, the continuation of sending packets will 
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spell out a message based on the transitions between events as they occur. This was alluded to 
in [14], in which the authors discuss hybrid covert channels.  While hybrid covert channels 
represent the ability for both a storage and timing channel to interact with the same 
destination at once, a transitional channel does not necessarily allow for the covert message to 
be stored or to modify an already existing file, but rather only keeps track of the events which 
occur.  
2. 4 Covert Channels versus Steganography 
Within the majority of the papers written on covert channels, there seems to be the ability and 
practice to interchange the phrases “covert channel” and “steganography.” While this thesis 
does not propose they are not very similar, and one may be a part of another, it does propose 
the two be separated and used in different contexts. As given in the definition earlier of a 
covert channel, a covert channel is “The ability for a communication to be sent over a 
communication medium which was either not designed to send alternate communications 
over, or that allows for the bypass of system security policies within the process [26].” On the 
contrary, this thesis proposes that steganography is: “The process through which a message is 
hidden within a static medium, which is unable or has a large amount of difficulty to be 
changed and can only be seen by a readily prepared party.” As discussed previously, this is not 
to say that covert channels and steganography are not similar in nature. This thesis proposes 
that a covert channel is within the realm of steganography in itself, but not the other way 
around. This is based on the conclusion that a covert channel must be contained within a 
transport medium rather than within a static medium and therefore would be in transport.  
Thus the covert channel would acquire a fleeting property in that if not captured, it cannot be 
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proven the covert channel ever existed.  On the other hand, a steganographical message will 
always exist unless completely destroyed, and is readily viewable and analyzable by any viewing 
party.   
The example of a drawing can be used when discussing steganography. A drawing may have a 
hidden message within it, codes or symbols embedded within it or a 3 dimensional image 
available to be seen by only those parties who have the knowledge in how to look at the image 
in a certain way or from a certain angle. While this can definitely be considered a 
steganographical image, the permanent nature of the image and the everlasting message 
contained within it do not make it a covert channel because of a covert channel’s fleeting 
properties and need to be captured to become steganography. In the example of the drawing, a 
message was hidden within the drawing, a medium which generally is not used to send 
messages in such a readily available form, and is relatively permanent. On the other hand, if a 
timing channel is sent to a destination machine and the packets are not analyzed as to the 
number which comes in every second, there is really no evidence which can be tracked at a 
later date as to what happened within this situation. The destination may have readily available 
the means to distinguish the message, but the message is not hidden within a static medium, 
but rather a dynamic one which is constantly changing, if only in the way that there is the 
change in which packets are being sent. There is also the ability to easily change the packets, in 
contrast to a drawing which is static and can only be changed by overwriting data, rather than 
modifying it as proposed here.  
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3. Applications to Voice over IP 
The biggest advantage to Voice over IP and the reason why it has become so popular is because 
of its real time transfer ability of both voice and data streams. This can be seen in the average 
VoIP call or video instant messaging applications, which have become more popular as 
promises of “free long distance calling” have been promoted.  The inner workings of Voice over 
IP are split into two different phases, one being the “signaling phase” and the other being the 
“conversation phase.”  Within the experimental section the signaling phase will be addressed as 
part of the experiments, [but both phases are explained with] SIP and SDP being part of the 
signaling phase and RTP being part of the conversation phase [16]. 
3. 1 SIP  
The SIP packet is the basic mechanism by which the sending party informs the receiving party 
that they would like to connect and exchange data.  As soon as the number for the receiving 
party is dialed and recognized, the PBX server, or proxy through which the VoIP phone is 
allowed access to the Internet and then continues on to the receiving party, sends a SIP 
message to the receiving end to invite them to take part in the call.  This SIP packet contains the 
basic information that is needed to communicate, similar to most other communication 
mediums, including the protocol being used in the SIP, maximum number of hops between 
source and destination, identification of the sender and receiver and the type of data that is 
contained within the transfer.  Once the receiving end acknowledges that they will take place in 
the call, i.e., the handset of the receiver is picked up, the receiving end sends a session 
description packet as it needs to inform the sending client which abilities it has and what it 
understands to be the agreed upon medium and encryption [16].  A SIP packet is also sent at 
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the end of the session to inform the receiving end that it is disconnecting, therefore ending the 
session. 
 
Figure 4: The VoIP call setup and breakdown [16] 
 




Figure 6: SIP and SDP color coded within a SIP packet for clarity [16] 
Within the following section, Figure 6 will play a large role and be referred to often. In Figure 6, 
it can be seen that there is an entire SIP packet which will be sent on initiation of the VoIP 
session. The packet itself is color coded by the authors of [16] for clarity, with the top section 
(lines 1 through 10) being in gray representing the session initiation protocol as opposed to the 
session description protocol (lines 11 through 18) being in white at the bottom of the image. 
Both of these are contained within the SIP packet that is sent to the destination party when the 
call is initiated, which allows for the opposite party to begin to process and receive the 
information that the source is trying to do so with. As can be seen while analyzing the SIP 
packet, there are a number of different details sent from the source to the destination when 
the call is initiated. Within the initiation packet, the source sends an invite to join the call to the 
destination, consisting of the address from which the call came from, the source, destination, 
maximum number of forwards for the call to take, the identification number, contact, and type 
of call that is being initiated (voice as opposed to data). As can be seen in Figure 6, there are a 
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number of fields bolded, which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. A similar practice is 
done in the SDP, which is contained within lines 11 through 18 and has a white background.  
The SIP, in general, supports five characteristics of a call including the location, availability, 
capabilities, session setup and session management, as documented within Request for 
Comments 3261 [22]. While the first two characteristics, location and availability are relatively 
self explanatory, the additional three may require some additional explanation. A user’s 
capability is determined based on what media they are attempting to connect to the session 
through, and the parameters of the media and device they are using to connect. The session 
setup is the part of the call in which there is a “ringing” [22] and a party is invited to join the 
session. The client is also informed of the capabilities so that an agreement between the 
sending and receiving parties can be made. This may be used to invite additional parties into a 
conference type call, with an additional SIP packet being sent to the desired invitees. While not 
all of the fields are necessary and the bulk of them are ignored by the SIP completely, they are 
included in the SIP packet to ensure uniformity across VoIP sessions.  
As can be seen in Figure 6, a number of fields are bolded, the bold text representing fields 
which have the ability to be changed, either because they are ignored by the SIP altogether, or 
the information that they provide does not lend anything to the call other than a formality. 
While the fields do have to exist, because of their criticality to establishing the call itself, they 
theoretically can be changed in a number of different ways to be potential covert channels. As 
can be seen on the second line of the session initiation protocol, the branch statement is used 
to form an identification for the transaction that will occur within the call [16]. While in [16] it is 
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seen that the branch statement does have to begin with “z9hG4bK,” the other 5 digits can be 
modified to send a covert message, without fear of having the call dropped or the message 
detected. This lends itself to the ability to send a covert message using the SIP, but there are 
also a number of other fields which allow for a similar practice. Fields such as Max-Forwards, 
tag (within the source address), call ID (before the domain name), cseq (the sequence in which 
the call was originally sent, for identification purposes), and contact (before the actual contact 
name and domain) can theoretically be changed to allow for covert messages to be sent. This is 
because none of them are necessarily required for the voice call to successfully take place, but 
rather are for convenience once the packet reaches the destination [16].  
3. 2 SDP  
The SDP packet is sent after the SIP packet has been accepted at the receiving end to inform 
the sending party what protocols can be used within the VoIP call, as well as at intervals 
throughout the call to ensure that media attributes have not changed.  While this interval is not 
specified in the RFC [8], it can be observed as being sent midway through the call (8 seconds 
into a 13 second call) in Figure 5.  This packet is sent from the receiving end with details such as 
the media attributes which the two clients are connected by, the owner and session ID, the 
time which the call and conference calls become active and the name of session, usually 
populated by the name of the soft phone client.  Within the SDP, a number of variables are 
used, including v, o, s, t, and k. These all represent needed values within the SDP which are also 
available to be changed and include covert messages. The variables stand for:  
V - Version, a field usually ignored by the session initiation protocol  
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O - The owner from which the message originated made up of random numbers  
S - Session name, also ignored by the SIP and SDP  
T - Time session active, ignored by the SIP and SDP  
K - Potential encryption that is used within the SIP and SDP  
Within these fields, each variable has caveats which allow for them to be changed or added to, 
which is the reason why they are unneeded and can be changed. The “v” or version field is the 
version of the Session Description Protocol being used within the current call. All version 
numbers are whole numbers with no “minor version numbers” [8]. Because of the 
communication of version number, so long as the version number specified is accepted at the 
receiving end of the VoIP call, the version can be changed to convey a message, assuming both 
parties establish a way not to convey accidental messages with automatically populated version 
numbers. The origin field, or “o” variable, is seen on line 12 of Figure 6, and has three sections 
of its field highlighted in bold. The origin is made up of the user name of the sending party, 
along with a session id and session version number. The session id, as of the writing of [8], has 
no uniform implementation, but rather has suggested ways that the equipment processing the 
VoIP call can use, specifically the suggestion of using a Network Time Protocol (NTP) as the 
session id to allow for calls to be more accurate based on the time sent and received. The 
version number is similar to the session id, in that it is randomly assigned, and is only used to 
establish which message has been sent most recently, especially when looking into proxy 
announcements. This allows for the receiving party to determine which messages are most 
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recent, and is therefore also recommended to utilize an NTP timestamp, for the same reasons 
as the session ID.  
The session description protocol is actually quite similar to the SIP in terms of the fields within 
both. In the first field (line 11 of Figure 6) the version of the SDP protocol being used is 
displayed but ignored by the destination, other than to establish which version of the SDP is 
being used and therefore how it will be processed on the receiving end. Therefore, so long as 
the field is changed to a currently used and accepted version by the receiving party, and a 
version check is actually done by the receiving party, this version number can be changed to 
include some sort of single digit covert channel.  
Similar to the version number, the owner is made up of a string field and two random 
identification numbers following it. As with the version number, these owner fields should exist 
within the SDP packet, but do not necessarily have to be whatever the system assigns to the 
original. While the end of this field will identify the domain from which the call originated, the 
owner and two identification numbers can be changed to send a covert message. The session 
name (variable s) and time the session is activated (variable t) will have a similar quality, while 
using t to send a covert message may border on being a time based covert channel, with the 
others being storage based, based on their existence within the protocol when sent. Both of 
these fields are theoretically able to be modified to send covert channels, mainly because they 
are made up of assigned strings of characters, or a random string of numbers, respectively [8].  
A field which does not exist in Figure 6, but is claimed to be available by the RFC is “i” which is 
the session description. This description is user defined and can be a string of characters input 
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by the user, and therefore would be an obvious place to look for covert channels if analyzing 
the packet. A special case to be analyzed is k. K is the encryption protocol used while sending 
the SDP, a field which is mostly unused, but can be used when the need for encryption of VoIP 
call itself arises. Within Figure 6, line 16 shows the k variable as it would naturally be without 
encryption, stating, as its first string, ”clear” meaning there is no encryption being 
implemented. While there are very few sources that clearly explain how the encryption or 
decryption is done when implementing it over a covert channel, the assumption of the author is 
that both parties can either verify that the key is the same on both ends of the call, to ensure 
that the message was not intercepted, or the encryption key can be used for some type of 
software that is implemented to encrypt and decrypt the call for the source and destination, 
respectively. The key may also be entered by the receiving party, as briefly covered in [8].  
3. 3 RTP  
In addition to SDP and SIP, there is also the ability for real time transfer protocol, or RTP, to be 
used within the realm of covert channels as well. Because of the nature of RTP and the need for 
a codec to be used within it to compress and decompress the voice of the sender/receiver, 
there are actually two different ways to embed a covert channel within the protocol itself. The 
first is demonstrated briefly in Figure 7 [26], but still requires a bit of explanation. When the call 
is established between the source and destination, the invite has been accepted and the 
process to condition the line to allow for voice transmission begins. This conditioning consists of 
allowing for the sender to speak into the VoIP device that is available on their end and have 
their voice compressed into a digital signal. When the signal is compressed using a codec, it is 
encoded into a stream of bits and then has the ability to be blended with another audio source 
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if so chosen. The authors of [26] choose to do exactly this, and blend the voice stream as 
captured from the VoIP device with another digital audio track. In this way, when the two 
parties are having a conversation, there is another voice track, in the case of [26] a music track, 
but this can also be another voice, which is playing. This secondary track would be what a third 
party would hear if they tried to tap the line.  
 
Figure 7: Blending of the original audio signal and another audio signal to embed a privacy 
covert channel 
The second ability for use of RTP covert messages is the use of modified fields, similar to SIP 
and SDP. As can be seen in Figure 8 [16], a number of fields are labeled optional or 
recommended and allow for the modification of them to allow for a cover channel to be 
embedded within the packet itself. The advantage to using this over the blended audio stream 
is the ability for multiple messages to be sent, one within each packet that is sent out 
throughout the VoIP session. Because of the nature of the VoIP session, multiple packets are 
sent out throughout the VoIP call, which allows for a new message to be sent out each time an 
RTP packet is sent.  
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When it comes to the actual fields that can be used, there are four main parts of the protocol 
that can be utilized. The padding field is the first which can be utilized, mainly because it is used 
for encryption algorithms when implemented. If the encryption algorithm is not implemented, 
the padding field will be set to 0 and a length of the padding field can be set as the last octet of 
the padding itself. This octet will tell the destination how many fields to ignore when the data is 
received, including itself. This is also the situation with the extended header, which is set in 
field 3 of the first line, similar to the padding field being set to true or false. Similar to SIP, the 
RTP packet contains the ability to modify the sequence field, a relatively random field which 
specifies the order in which the packet was sent. In addition, the time field can also be used, 
but must be used on the first packet because this will establish what the value of the field in 
subsequent packets will contain. Interestingly, the timestamp field can also be used in a second 
way to send covert messages. The value of the timestamp field determines when the packet 




Figure 8: Illustration of the possibility to modify the RTP protocol to send a covert message 
The authors of [14] propose that if a packet is sent from the source to the destination but is 
somehow delayed in transit, or the time field modified to represent a type of delay in transit, 
the packet will still make its way to the destination, but will be dropped and not processed in 
the VoIP session itself. While this has to be done with great care because of the limited 
threshold of error that a VoIP stream can handle, there is still the possibility to change the 
timestamp field resulting in a covert message being able to be hidden inside. Within the 
timestamp field there is also a least significant bit which can be modified to send covert 
messages as well.  
In addition to being able to modify the timestamp while using RTP, there is also the ability to 
modify the stream itself and embed datagrams into the stream instead of actual voice. This, 
again, has to be used with great care, because of the error threshold that each codec, which 
will be sending and receiving the voice data, has. For example, the voice codec G723.1 has a 1 
percent error capability. This may cause problems because of such a small error rate, as 
compared to G729A which allows for up to a 3 percent error rate. While neither is ideal for 
sending an excessively large message to recipients, they both add an additional possibility of 
covert channels [14].  
4. Experimental Setup 
While much research was done to explain the types of covert messages and locations where 
covert messages could be hidden, there was no evidence that was found to demonstrate that 
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these experiments were actually carried out. For this thesis, these experiments were carried 
out within a virtual environment with three virtual machines, one acting as a server and the 
other two as clients. For the virtual clients, VMWare Workstation 6.5.1 was utilized under an 
academic license registered to Rochester Institute of Technology. Each client consisted of a 
Windows XP SP3 operating system, each running with 512MB of RAM AND 64 GB Maximum 
capacity for their hard drives. Both clients were licensed under the Microsoft Academic Alliance 
Licensing. For the phones used in this experiment, the decision was made to use software 
phones to keep the cost to a minimum and to ensure that the SIP protocol was actually used, 
rather than proprietary protocols used commonly with hardware based phones such as 
Polycom [20]. With this in mind, X-Lite version 3.0 build 29712 was used on both clients, which 
used the SIP protocol and also added an extra field to the SDP which will turn out to be 
beneficial later in the experiment. 
For the server, Windows 2008 64 bit edition was used and licensed under Microsoft Academic 
Alliance Licensing, and was given 1024 MB of RAM and 64GB of maximum hard drive space. The 
server ran its own PBX, 3CX PBX specifically, which allows for a free server to be installed on any 
server, interface with an outside voice over IP provider and be managed by a user with little or 
no experience [1]. It is web console based and allows for individual phones to be added and 
assigned unique identities, extensions and properties. When connected, clients are registered 
into the 3CX system and are passed these identities.  
As can be seen in Figure 6 and proposed in the original experiment, the authors of [6] proposed 
that within the SIP and SDP there are a number of fields that can be changed to embed covert 
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messages. In Figure 6, each field that is bolded was proposed to be able to carry a covert 
message, without affecting the outcome of the call or the connection that is made between the 
sender and the receiver. In the following sections, each one of these fields will be examined 






Figure 9: A clean SIP/SDP packet as captured by Winsock Packet Editor 
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5. 1 The branch statement 
The first experiment that was run was on the first field noted in [6], or the branch statement. 
The branch statement is claimed to have to begin with a standardized phrase of “z9hG4bK” but 
has five characters after which it can be modified according to the authors, rather than the 29 
found while carrying out the experiment. In the experimental setup, Wireshark was used in 
conjunction to Winsock Packet Editor to view the packets and record the results as the packets 
were edited. While using Winsock Packet Editor, it was found that there is the ability to 
successfully modify the last five characters of the branch statement by inputting the hex values 
of the required standardized branch statement and appending a message to them, also in hex 
format. In this case, z9hG4bK translates into 7A 39 68 47 34 62 4B which was the searched for 




Figure 10: The Hex translation of the “z9hG4bK” Key in the Branch statement 
The result of the modification of the branch statement was a successfully connected call for the 
receiver, but the client not being able to recognize that the call was connected and therefore 
timing out and dropping the call. According to packet capturing tools, as can be seen in Figure 
11, the sender believes that because it was unable to receive a properly formed SIP/SDP packet 
back from the receiver that the session is not connected and in fact, does not exist. Notice in 
the Status-Line the message “SIP/2.0481 Call/Transaction Does Not Exist.” 
Interestingly, the branch statement is much longer in experiments than originally proposed in 
[6]. Even with additional experiments run to test the first five characters after the phrase of 





Figure 11: Example of a failed call as illustrated through a Wireshark capture of 
“Call/Transaction does not exist” 
5. 2 Max-Forwards 
The Max-Forwards line is usually set to a value of 70, indicating the number of times that the 
VoIP packet should be forwarded between routers while on its route to the 
destination/receiver. This value is small and may not be enough to send an overly complex 
covert message, but with the agreement between sender and receiver that the value should be 
70 unless there is a covert message embedded in it, this could at least be an indicator that a 
covert message is embedded in the actual packet. 
As can be seen in Figure 12, WPE was set up to filter and change the value of Max-Forwards, 
based on its hex value and change it up to ten times within any packets sent or received. In 
Figures 12 and 13, we can see that the packet was successfully changed and resulted in a 
completed call between the sender and receiver. 
While there are drawbacks to using this field for embedding covert messages, namely that 
there are only two characters that can be used to send either a signal or message, as well as a 
non-standardized value to be placed in this field, this method of sending covert messages does 
work and allows for calls to be established and maintained. With careful planning and careful 













Figure 14: Illustration of Max-Forwards changed to 95 
5. 3 The tag Field 
Similar to the previous fields, Max-Forwards and Branch, the tag field also had the problem of 
allowing for the call to connect to the other side, but not being recognized on the sender’s side 
as being connected. This is thought to be because of a malformed packet when an 
acknowledgement is received from the receiving side at the sender side. In tests that were run 
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on the tag field, similar results were returned as in the error found while testing the branch 
statement, in which “Transaction does not exist,” was returned. 
5. 4 Call-ID Field 
The Call-ID field was tested multiple times with multiple values due to a number of different 
examples and theories by both source authors and this experiment’s author. The Call-ID field in 
[6] was full of only numbers and thus was tested as such in the first experiment. This resulted in 
a similar result as the previous fields in which the call went through as seen by the receiver, but 
an error of “Transaction does not exist” was returned to the sender (in packet form). 
In contrast to what was seen in [6], during the experiment it was observed that the Call-ID field 
was actually made up of numerous alphanumeric characters, as can be seen in the image 
below. 
Therefore, the Call-ID was tested a second time with multiple alphanumeric characters, 
specifically the phrase “dropthebomb” embedded into the message. With the observation of 
this also not working, the idea that the first character of the line might also need to remain the 
same, or at least that of a hex character, as it was in each of the tests. Therefore, an additional 
test of allowing the first character to remain unchanged, but subsequent characters modified 
was performed, but also failed.  With this change, the Call-ID field read “Edropthebomb” and 
still failed to connect. Finally, the theory that characters within the Call-ID field must be hex 
based characters (1..9, a…f) was experimented with, but again resulted in the same conclusion. 
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5. 5 CSeq 
In the testing environment, a discrepancy was seen as compared to [6] in that the CSeq variable 
was only one numeric character, rather than 5 as proposed in the original source. This is 
proposed to be because of the very limited number of clients that were involved in the 
experiment, and the very small number of calls that were made on either client in the 
experiment. The CSeq number, according to the [8], is incremented based on the number of 
dialogs per session. Therefore, while this was tested and successfully proved to be a viable 
candidate for embedded covert channels, rather than multiple numerical characters being able 
to be embedded into the stream (5 in the example of [6]), it was only a single character. While 
this may be limiting in the types of covert messages that could be embedded, there would be 
the ability to at least signal the receiver of the presence of a covert channel. 
5. 6 From 
From seemed to be one of the most useful fields in the experiment because of its valid ability to 
be changed and have covert messages embedded in it, as well as how it works when picked up 
by the receiving client. The From field is in essence the caller id field that would be seen in the 
average telephone call, and indicates to the receiver who is calling through the display of the 
softphone as seen in Figure 15. As can be seen, the caller ID field was changed to 
“Sdropbomb2” from “Softphone2” while keeping the contact information such as email and 
response address the same, and therefore allowed for an immediate covert message to be 
popped up on the screen. This call was able to complete successfully, as evidenced in the 
graphic below, and would therefore be a viable candidate for covert messages. While there is 
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the ability for this field to be changed, the caveat that any onlookers can easily see a covert 
channel on receipt should be carefully evaluated before using this field. 
 
 






Figure 16: Change in the From field as seen by the Winsock Packet Editor 
5. 7 SDP V field 
THE V field as found in the SIP is usually the version of the SIP protocol being used, to ensure 
compatibility between different processing systems, i.e., different VoIP phones. This field is 
generally ignored now that [8] containing information about SIP has been officially accepted 
and thus was theorized as able to be changed with no adverse effects on the call itself. Through 
experimentation and editing the V field as based on a “v=” keyword, it was found that the SDP 
V field was successfully changed to 4 rather than 0 with no effect on the call whatsoever. 
Although this was done using the client on either side of the VoIP exchange, there should be no 
adverse effects on the call even using a different receiving software client due to evidence that 
this field is ignored during the initiation. 
5. 8 SDP O field 
The O field is used to identify the owner from which a message originated and is formatted in a 
<user><number><number> format. It seemed while conducting the experiment that these 
fields were made up of id numbers or time stamps and therefore when they were changed, 
caused the call to fail. In the original source [6], the authors proposed that this field should be 
ignored by the receiving client, but when these numbers were changed to different numbers, 
the call connected on the receiving client’s end and failed on the sending client’s end, reporting 
back a “transaction does not exist” error, similar to previously tested fields.  
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5. 9 SDP S field 
The S field is the field of the SIP which gives a session name to the VoIP transfer. Unlike other 
fields such as the tag or Call-ID field, the S field is ignored and only used when the client is able 
to read the plain text session name and display it. In the experiment, the S field was ignored 
and therefore successfully modified with no affect on the call whatsoever. The session name 
was changed to the common “dropthebomb” phrase that was used throughout the 
experiments to ensure the conformity with a standard alpha based phrase. 
5. 10  SDP T field 
Similar to the CSeq field, the T field is used to determine the time that the session became 
active, both on the sending and receiving ends. Therefore, there are two numerical fields that 
are used for information with a space between them. According to [6] these fields are supposed 
to be ignored and therefore not affect the call if changed.  When changing the T fields, the call 
completed successfully with the standard values of “0 0” being changed to “8 9”.  The call 




Figure 17: Change in the T field from “0 0” to “8 9” 
5. 11 SDP K field 
While carrying out the experiment, it seemed odd that a K field was not found while monitoring 
the packets, either while monitoring them with WPE or with Wireshark. When more research 
was done into this area it was found that the K field may only exist in the SIP’s of clients which 
support an encrypted call to be made. With free software based phones, this was not possible 
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and thus there was no K field to modify. A future version of this experiment could be done to 
try to demonstrate the abilities to hide covert channels within encrypted Voice over IP calls, but 
is currently cost prohibitive and outside the scope of this overall experiment. 
6. Further Discussion 
Unlike the RTP transport protocol that is used to carry the actual voice data to the receiving end 
during the VoIP session, and which also has the ability to carry covert messages within it [5] the 
SIP and SDP have the advantage of requiring an acknowledgement message to be sent before 
they will allow for voice data to be sent.  While the covert channel that is being sent within the 
SIP and SDP has to be small because of the limited amount of room within the packet, there is 
the advantage that the sender will know that the receiver has received the covert message 
because of the acknowledgement that is returned once the SIP and SDP packets have been 
received and accepted.  Interestingly, this goes against the basic properties of User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP), which is what VoIP is said to communicate over.  UDP’s property of making a 
“best effort” attempt to send the message to the receiving party would usually make for a poor 
communication medium/protocol to send covert messages over.  In contrast, SIP and SDP use 
the acknowledgement system which makes them a great message carrier. 
Another advantage that this method has as compared to other covert channels, including those 
used in RTP, is that the covert message being sent has to be detected at the very beginning of 
the call.  If a packet capture were to begin after the phone has rung and been picked up, the SIP 
and SDP packets will have already been sent and there is only a very small likelihood that 
additional messages will be contained in the maintenance SDP packets.  This also lends itself to 
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the advantage of RTP packets being seen as UDP packets if the control packet, or RTCP packet, 
is not seen at the beginning of the call.  Therefore, they would be indistinguishable from any 
other average UDP packet being sent across the network. 
With these advantages, though, come disadvantages as well.  As was seen in the experiments, if 
the acknowledgement packet is not sent, usually because the SIP or SDP packet is malformed, 
the call cannot complete and no data is able to be sent.  While this does not impact the result 
of being able to send a covert message across the line in the SIP or SDP packet, it does cause a 
bit of suspicion if observed by a systems administrator.  Given the wealth of knowledge 
available regarding covert messages and this thesis, a systems administrator could continuously 
monitor that extension or soft phone for variances from the packet norm. 
This leads to another disadvantage: currently to detect a covert channel within the SIP and SDP 
packets, a systems administrator would have to run a packet capture utility on the VoIP device 
and continuously monitor until a covert message is sent.  Because the call may not come at a 
specific time or interval, this could be extremely time consuming both in capturing and the 
effort to monitor VoIP logs. 
This thesis also does not account for the ability for a single message to be carried within SIP or 
SDP packets over multiple calls, or in terms of cover channels “an event based channel over 
time.”  While the tool provided in the following sections does account for any SIP or SDP packet 
which may have changed values, it is up to human logic to detect the full string through which 
the message is sent.  This could include piecing together the values of Max-Forwards, or any 
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other SIP or SDP field for that matter, which presents a danger solely based on the time and 
effort needed to do so. 
 
Figure 18: Illustration of VoIP being seen as UDP within Wireshark 
7.  Entropy 
In any communication medium in which there is a message being sent, especially between 
multiple carriers, we have to worry about entropy.  Entropy, put simply, is the uncertainty that 
the message that is received on the receiving end, is different than that sent from the sending 
end of the medium.  In the realm of probability, entropy is the idea that there is a certain 
variable which the experimenter is oblivious to, and thus there is a possibility of multiple results 
occurring the more times the experiment is repeated.  Take for example the simple game of a 
coin being flipped.  If we assume the coin is fair and both sides are weighted the same as to 
produce an equal probability of landing upward, we can confidently say there is a 1 in 2 (1/2) 
probability that either side will face upward on the coin’s landing.  However, if we do not have 
the confidence that a coin is fair and both sides are weighted evenly, another variable is added 
into the equation.  This variable is actually two fold in which we now have a probability of each 
side landing, thus probability p for heads and q of tails [6]. 
49 
 
In the first example in which both sides had an equal chance of facing upward when the coin 
lands, we say that the coin has an entropy of 1.  There is the possibility of either side facing 
upward because the coin is even and the outcome of either side facing upward is only left up to 
chance.  In the second example of the coin in which there are two probabilities, different 
possibilities for either side to face upward when the coin lands, we can confidently say that 
there is an entropy of less than 1, but an exact value is impossible to come up with without the 
exact probabilities.  In a final case that could be made in which the coin does not have a tails 
side, but rather is double-headed, we can confidently say that the coin has an entropy value of 
zero because there is only a single possibility and thus no unknown variable of chance which 
can be factored into the coin toss. 
Entropy was originally proposed by Claude E. Shannon in his paper “A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication,” published in 1948 [6].  This paper was based on the work of Lazare Carnot, 
who originally coined the concept of entropy as it applied to the concept of energy in a working 
system, in which a certain amount of energy is lost during work in the form of heat [9].  This 
concept can easily be seen in the example of friction, especially for anyone who has used a 
grinding wheel to grind metal or sharpen a blade.  When the grinding wheel first starts running, 
it is cold and wastes very little energy while running on its own.  When the wheel comes in 
contact with the piece of metal, wasteful energy can be seen visually in the way of sparks 
coming off of the metal and through touch due to the heat that is dissipated into both the 
wheel and the blade itself. 
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Another more relevant example of entropy in the communications field is the childhood game 
known as “telephone.”  In the game, a number of people line up and a message is verbally given 
to the first member of the line in a way that will not allow for the rest of the members to hear.  
This person is given the task to pass this message to the next person in line in the same manner, 
but cannot repeat the message once it has been given.  At the final person (n-1), the message is 
repeated out loud and an evaluation of the difference between the original message and the 
one which is received is done.  This example is quite similar to the idea of embedding a covert 
channel, because is it very similar to the process through which voice over IP works.  For each 
member that the message has to travel through in the telephone line, there is a higher 
probability that the message will not be the exact same one as the message which originally 
entered the telephone system.  Therefore, there is also the ability that each member may 
embed unneeded data into the message, which may not even be recognizable to the other 
members, and thus send a covert message either to a member later on in the telephone chain, 
or just send a false message to the final member of the telephone chain.  For each member 
through which the message has to pass, there is a 50% chance that the exact message 
understood by them will be that which their sender sent, and thus for each new person that is 
added to the chain, the probability that the message will continue to be correct at the final 
receiver is 1/2
n-1
.  This is exactly the problem with voice over IP and why they are so susceptible 
to embedded covert messages. 
Within each field of the voice over IP communication, there is the ability to compare entropy by 
viewing the sent message to the acknowledgement message that is received by the second 
party.  This limits the ability for a covert channel to exist undetected once it leaves the sending 
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party (as would be the case in a man in the middle attack), but when it comes to covert 
channels purposely sent by the sender, there is the need for analysis of the field as compared 
to what it should be as based on default settings or common settings which have either no 
ability or rare ability to be changed on the SIP server itself.  In the following paragraphs, it will 
be attempted to evaluate the amount of entropy in each field that was found to be able to be 
changed within the original experiment.  Because of the needed equations, which will be given 
in the following paragraphs, entropy will not always be a value between zero and one, and it 
will be assumed that there are only two parties involved in the call as to not introduce 
uncertain variables from multiple other parties. 
7.1 Branch 
The Branch field is a unique identifier that is used by both the sender and the receiver in the 
form of the Via statement.  When a request is made for a client to join a call, in the way of an 
INVITE packet being sent, both clients will use the same assigned Branch statement throughout 
the call.  The Branch statement must be unique in both the way of the current call and all past 
and future calls, and must begin with the characters “z9hG4bK” in that order and case sensitive.  
Interestingly, there is no specific standard for the number of characters that make up the 
Branch statement, but for the sake of consistency, this thesis will use an assumed 42 characters 
to make up the Branch statement [22].  Because of the needed structure of the first 7 
characters, they can be excluded from the entropy calculation, as well as the needed 6 hyphens 
able to be excluded.  With the assumption that 26 English alphabet characters can be used in 
either uppercase or lower case and 10 standard numbers, for each applicable character within 
the 29 character string, there are a total of 62 possibilities.  Therefore, the calculation of 
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entropy for the branch statement will be log262
29
=172.6717, as rounded to four places after the 
decimal point. 
7.2 Max-Forwards 
The Max-Forwards field is a standard field in all SIP sends in which the sending end of the call 
sets a type of time to live (TTL) for the packet which, if reached, will indicate the packet as not 
received and the receiver not available within the given specifications.  The Max-Forwards field 
is usually set to 70 as it has been found to be the standard and unchangeable within the 3CX 
test bed system.  Therefore, as the variables given here are constant, we can very easily detect 
the possibility of a covert message by comparing the current Max-Forwards value to the 
standard value of 70.  In the experimental section, it can be seen in the screen shot that Max-
Forwards was changed to 95, indicating a possible message being sent to the second party.  
While this may impact the call itself, especially if this number is set to a value less the 70, we 
can still conclude that there is a definite indicator of a covert message being embedded in the 
call.  To calculate the entropy, we assume that the Max-Forwards variable will stay at two 
digits, as found to be the case in both this experiment and the original case [16].  Therefore 
with the two digits having ten possibilities each we can calculate the entropy to be as follows: 
log210
2
 = 6.6439, as rounded to four places after the decimal point. 
7.3 Tag 
The tag field of the SIP is generally used as an identifier for both the sender and the receiver.  It 
is unique to each client within the VoIP network and is randomized “with at least 32 bits of 
randomness” [22].  Within a given VoIP call, the tag field will be different in the “From” field 
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(receiver side) and the “To” field, a property which would hold even if the call was sent in the 
opposite direction.  In other words, if client A is assigned id 12345, if the call was sent in the 
opposite direction, in this case client B, the assigned id would still not be 12345, even for the 
same call session [22].  When analyzing the tag field, we maintain the assumption that the tag 
field will always be 8 characters long and have a possibility of 16 characters because of the 
observed use of only hex based letters and digital numbers within the 3CX test bed system.  
Therefore, the entropy for the tag field would be given by the equation: log216
8
 = 32. 
7.4 Call-ID  
The Call-ID field is randomly generated for each call and links messages together.  As can be 
seen in the results section of this thesis, it is unable to carry a covert channel because of its 
specification that it must be the same for every request and response sent by a specific user 
agent.  Even though it must be the same for every call, it also must be randomly selected as to 
not be chosen by two agents at any given time.  Therefore, when we discuss the entropy of the 
Call-ID field, we can safely say that the entropy is 1 due to no detectable pattern to apply and 
predict what a given call should have as a Call-ID.  Screen shots can be seen below as to the 
difference in Call-ID’s within legitimate calls [22].  Theoretically, if the protocol was changed to 




7.5 CSeq  
CSeq, or the call sequence, is the way that SIP keeps calls and packets in order as they arrive at 
the server.  For each new call made within the VoIP network, the CSeq field is incremented and 
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sent within the SIP, along with the method for which the packet is being used.  The most 
common method is “INVITE” mainly because the SIP packet is acting as an invite for another 
user agent to join the call.  According to the Request for Comments which addresses SIP, non-
registered requests that enter the network to reach a specified client are assigned random CSeq 
numbers, rather than the sequential ones used for registered calls, and are in the format of a 
number less than 2
31
.  From this information we can determine that the entropy of the CSeq 
field can be calculated as log22
31
-1 = 30.9999 [22]. 
7.6 Contact  
The contact field is populated based on what ID is given to the phone by the system 
administrator and thus passed down to the phone on its registration with the SIP server.  In the 
experiment, the two softphones were set as Softphone2 and Softphone1, as sender and 
receiver respectively, and thus the entropy could be discovered by comparing the received 
identification name of the sender, to that which was assigned to it from the server by the 
systems administrator.  With this characteristic being true, we can conclude that the entropy of 
the Contact field would be 1.  On the other hand, if there was no way to tell if the Contact 
variable as assigned by the sending party was the same as the one which was received by the 
receiving party, there is a bit more complication added into the entropy calculation.  According 
to RFC 3261, the contact can be up to 15 characters and be any combination of standard 
alphanumeric characters as discussed in the branch statement.  In addition to an identifier, 
there is also an IP address appended to the field within angle brackets, and a port number from 











 = 138.3233. 
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7.7 SDP V 
As with the Max-Forwards field, in which there was a default value set to 70 which was unable 
to be easily changed, the SDP V field has a default value of 0, due to its property of being the 
version of a given announcement sent to the client.  Usually, there is only a single 
announcement sent to the client because the description of the call or data type contained 
within it voice is unlikely to change, but there is the possibility of the description or data 
changing.  Therefore, even though the field is not readily apparent to the sender or receiver 
when they are sending or receiving the call, respectively, upon further inspection, it can easily 
be discovered as to whether a covert message may be hiding in the field by comparing the V 
field’s value to the standard one of 0, especially if the description has not been changed by the 
user.  Based on this evidence, the calculation of entropy would be log210
1
 = 3.3219 [8]. 
7.8 SDP O 
The SDP O field is used to identify the originator of the session to which the clients are not 
taking part in.  The O field is made up of the username of the originator, session ID of the call 
and version, as well as the address of the originator’s host.  In the experimentation phase of 
this project, it was found that changing the session ID and call version of the O variable had no 
effect on the call and still allowed for a call to be completed successfully.  Similar to the contact 
field, we must calculate the entropy of the IP address as well as the two identifier variables and 












 = 65.1054. 
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8. Covert Channel Detection Tool 
Throughout the experiment, it was found that no tools actually existed for detecting covert 
channels within voice over IP streams.  Unless a systems administrator or network 
administrator poured over logs regarding the VoIP transactions that took place and 
meticulously dissected every SIP and SDP packet within those logs, there is little to no ability for 
the detection of covert channels within Voice over IP.  This downfall was furthered by the fact 
that if a VoIP call was intercepted midway into the call, the packets would not be seen as RTP or 
even SIP/SDP, but rather be seen as UDP packets because of the ability to identify them with 
the average packet scanning tool.  This is a problem which obviously needed to be fixed, based 
on the shown ability for attackers with malicious intent to embed messages very simply, using 
commercial off the shelf software (COTS), or just as easily be able to modify their own software 
to modify packets as needed.  Within the following paragraphs, an open source, java based, 
covert channel identifying program will be discussed, based on the work of Keita Fujii [7] and 
then modified by Patrick Lloyd with the help of Sean Madden. 
The program works by analyzing captured packets, similar to most other packet capture 
programs such as Wireshark.  While capturing the packets, the program also analyzes them 
with built in functionality from the original author, to discover the type of packet and break 
down the packet into its basic characteristics, including whether the packet is IPv4 or IPv6, UDP 
or TCP, the protocol through which the packet was sent, such as Ethernet, and basic 
information about the packet including the captured time and the captured length.  More 
technical details regarding the program follow. 
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Built in functionality included the ability for the program, JPCapDumper by Keita Fujii [7], to 
capture programs using the JPcap library which was developed for exactly this purpose.  The 
program then displays the frames in a table type format, and if the packet is analyzable based 
on given characteristics of supported packet formats, it displays these characteristics in the left 
hand pane in a tree type format.  Included formats for packets include: Ethernet packets, IPv4 
Packets, IPv6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet, SSH, SMTP, POP3, and ARP.  There is also a 
properties file which the program reads from to determine how to populate the columns on the 
top of the windows, based on child properties of each of the aforementioned protocols. 
With this framework, the UDP packet analyzer was used as a template to modify its abilities to 
analyze VoIP packets because of their distinct similarities, and further add in functionality to 
analyze whether a covert channel is present.  This analysis of a VoIP packet containing a covert 
channel is based on whether the packet contains the keyword “INVITE,” a keyword common to 
all VoIP SIP and SDP packets, because of the list of features that is contained within the packet 
(see line 00000150 of Figure 9).  Based on this proving true, another operation is then triggered 
to look for a regular expression which will detect and compare the variables: “Max-Forwards:” 
to be followed by 70, “V=” followed by 0, “T=” followed by “0 0”, and “O=” followed by “-“.  
These variables were the most easily changed and most common throughout multiple SIP 
formats, without affecting the quality and format of the call and packet.  If any of these 
variables do not match their default values, a “found” variable will be changed to a “true” 
boolean value and populate the characteristic of the VoIP child property Covert Channel, to be 





Figure 19: A covert channel detection tool with Packet Number, Source IP, Destination IP and 
Covert Channel indication 
If the keywords are not found, in other words if Max-Forwards is equal to 70, V is equal to 0, t is 
equal to 0 0, and o is equal to –, or the variables just are not found in the packet, indicating a 
non-SIP or non-SDP packet, the message of the covert channels column will be populated by a 
“No” or “Not Available,”thus signaling the administrator to pass over it.  The “Not Available” 
variable will be specific to a non-UDP formatter packet.  With the already built in ability to sort 
the column by values, a systems or network administrator would be able to look over the 
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record quickly and easily to determine whether a covert message may be present within the 




Figure 20: Flowchart depicting the operation of covert channels detection program 
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9. 3rd Party Developed Tools 
Within this thesis, a number of tools were discussed which allow a user to embed a covert 
message into a SIP or SDP packet and an administrator to detect these messages to protect the 
integrity and security of their network.  Other projects done by colleagues at Rochester 
Institute of Technology have focused on a similar task but rather than SIP and SDP, there is a 
focus on the ability to embed covert messages within the timestamp that is included in RTP 
packets while data is being sent between two clients.  Author Christopher Forbes [5], discusses 
the ability to change the timestamp of a given RTP packet to use a similar method as seen here: 
using two digits to send an ASCII code to the other user and not impair the quality of a VoIP call.  
Unlike SIP and SDP covert messages, RTP covert messages can be much more numerous 
because of the need for encoding that is used to send data to the receiving party.  This allows a 
much longer message to be sent to the receiving party while still using relatively simple 
methods to send them, mainly by using a C language based program. 
10. Future Work 
Future work includes more investigation being done on detecting steganography in images and 
other formats which allow for messages to be sent by being “in plain sight.”  By developing a 
larger understanding of the inner workings of steganography and how it can be impacted by 





This thesis has shown the ability to embed covert messages into a Voice over IP stream, merely 
by modifying the SIP and SDP packets which are sent at the beginning of the call.  While these 
messages must be small in nature and must be embedded into the call by using a packet 
modification tool, they present a clear and present danger to networks and companies which 
can be easily combated against by monitoring the packets that flow through a communications 
network.  To aid in the ability to monitor the network, a tool has been provided which allows 
for the capture of packets flowing through the communications network which also allows for a 
network administrator to sort the resulting packets to easily find an indicator of a covert 
channel message.  This indicator comes in the format of a simple Yes/No/Not Available option 
within the program. 
12. Works Cited  
[1] "3CX: Software based PBX for Windows." 3CX Phone System - software based VoIP IP PBX / 
PABX for Windows. 2009. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. <http://www.3cx.com/>. 
[2] Arrington, Michael. "Schwarzenegger Gives California Legislature A Hidden Finger." 
TechCrunch. 28 Oct. 2009. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. 
<http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/10/28/schwarzenegger-gives-california-legislature-
a-hidden-finger/>.  
[3] "ASCII Table." Ascii Table - ASCII character codes and html, octal, hex and decimal chart 
conversion. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. <http://www.asciitable.com/>.  
63 
 
[4] ”Codec.” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 17 May 2009. 19 May 2009 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codec>. 
[5] Forbes, Christopher R. "A New Covert Channel over RTP." Thesis. ROchester Institute of 
Technology, 2009. Print. 
[6] "Entropy (information theory) -." Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 31 Jan. 2010. Web. 01 
Feb. 2010. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_%28information_theory%29>.  
[7] Fujii, Keita. "JpcapDumper - Java packet capture library." Professor Tatsuya Suda's 
NETGROUP Webpage. 09 Jan. 2005. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. 
<http://netresearch.ics.uci.edu/~kfujii/JpcapDumper/doc/index.html>.  
[8] Handley, M., and V. Jacobson. "RFC 2327 (rfc2327) - SDP: Session Description Protocol." 
Internet FAQ Archives - Online Education. Apr. 1998. Web. 10 Nov. 2009. 
<http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2327.html>. 
[9] "History of Entropy." Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 9 Dec. 2009. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_entropy>. 
[10] ”ITU G.723.1 - voip-info.org.” Voip-info.org - voip-info.org. Voip-info.org, LLC. 19 May 2009 
<http://www.voipinfo.org/wiki/view/ITU+G.723.1>. 
[11] Johnson, Neil F. "Steganography - SEC202." Johnson & Johnson Technology Consultants, 
LLC. Nov. 1995. Web. 10 Nov. 2009. <http://www.jjtc.com/stegdoc/sec202.html>. 
64 
 
[12] Judge, James C. "Steganography: Past, Present, Future." Steganography: Past, Present, 
Future. SANS Institute, 2001. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. 
<http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/stenganography/steganography_pas
t_present_future_552>. 
[13] Kessler, Gary C. "Steganography for the Prosecutor and Computer Forensics Examiner." 
GaryKessler.net Home Page. Apr. 2004. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. 
<http://www.garykessler.net/library/ndaa_stego.html>. 
[14] Lubacz, Jzef, Wojciech Mazurczyk, and Krzysztof Szczypiorski. Hiding Data in VoIP. Diss. 
Warsaw University of Technology. Hiding Data in VoIP. Warsaw University of 
Technology. 19 May 2009 <http://www.asc2008.com/manuscripts/B/BP-13.pdf>. 
[15] Mazurczyk, Wojciech, and Krzysztof Szczypiorski. "Covert Channels in SIP for VoIP 
Signalling." Eglobal_sip_covert.pdf. Warsaw University of Technology, 2008. Web. 1 Feb. 
2010. <http://home.elka.pw.edu.pl/~wmazurcz/moja/art/Eglobal_sip_covert.pdf>.  
[16] Mazurczyk, Wojciech, and Krzysztof Szczypiorski. “Steganography of VoIP streams.” Diss. 
Warsaw University of Technology. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2008. 
[17] McCullagh, Declan. "Bin Laden: Steganography Master?" Wired News. 07 Feb. 2001. Web. 
01 Feb. 2010. <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/02/41658>. 
[18] Mercuri, Rebecca T. "The Many Colors of Multimedia Security." The Many Colors of 






[19] O'Neill, Helen. "VoIP Providers List - VoIP Providers USA." VoIP Providers List Worldwide 
VoIP Providers Directory. Web. 10 Nov. 2009. 
<http://www.voipproviderslist.com/country/voip-usa/voip-providers-usa/sort-
byname/65/>.  
[20] "Polycom® IP Conference Phones for Avaya." Avaya Interoperability Guide. Polycom 
Worldwide. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. <Avaya Interoperability Guide>. 
[21] ”Real-time Transport Protocol -.” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 18 May 2009. 
Wikipedia. 19 May 2009 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-time Transport Protocol>. 
[22] Rosenberg, J., H. Schulzrinne, G. Camarillo, A. Johnston, J. Peterson, R. Sparks, M. Handley, 
and E. Schooler. "Session Initiation Protocol." Internet Engineering Task Force. June 
2002. Web. 10 Nov. 2009. <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3261.txt>.  
[23] SampleDiagonal.jpg. 2009. Photograph. 
<Http://www.shutterfreaks.com/Actions/WatermarkSignatures/SampleDiagonal.jpg>.  
[24] "Star Trek: The Episode Guide." "The Killing Game II" 28 June 2006. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. 
<http://stvoy.epguides.info/?ID=522&ComingFrom=%3FKey%3D7798&Key=5141>. 




[26] Takahashi, Takehiro, and Wenke Lee. An assessment of VoIP covert channel threats. Diss. 
Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007. An assessment of VoIP covert channel threats. 21 
Sept. 2007. IEEE. 19 May 2009 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4550357&isnumber=4550291>. 
[27] "Voice Over IP Statistics - Number and Duration of calls per Year." Greek University 
Network, 2005. Web. 10 Nov. 2009. <http://voip.noc.uoa.gr/voipstat/query-call-per-
year.php?v=1&lang=en>. 
[28] ”Voice Over IP - Availability Statistics.” Voice Over IP – Availability Statistics. 2005. Greek 
University Network. 19 May 2009 <http://voip-availability.gunet.gr/?lang=en>. 
